The common law rules of fellow servant, assumption of risk, and contributory negligence posed a series of daunting obstacles for nineteenthcentury workers seeking to recover for injuries suffered on the job. Strong opposition to the "unholy trinity"' of the common law's workplace accident regime began to develop among progressive reformers in the first decade of the twentieth century. In 1910, New York State enacted the first modem workmen's2 compensation law in the United States, providing compensation to injured workers and their families without regard to fault.3 By the end of the decade an astounding thirty-nine states, the District of Columbia, and three U.S. territories had followed New York's lead.4
which the transformation of the law of work accidents reflected and gave shape to an important shift in the ways in which Americans thought about and organized work itself. This Note argues that the nineteenth-century law of workplace accidents is perhaps best understood by reference to what historian Daniel Rodgers has described as nineteenth-century Americans' "moral preoccupation with labor."6
The nineteenth-century work ethic contained within itself a critical ambiguity. For even as the work ethic could sustain ideas about the dignity of work and the moral value of labor, it could also serve the economic interests of employers seeking to create a disciplined and industrious workforce. The contention of Part I of this Note is that the common law of work accidents captured the deep ambiguities of the nineteenth-century work ethic. In many instances, nineteenth-century work accident law cynically deployed notions of the value of worker responsibility and self-reliance in such a way as to obscure employer power and enforce employee discipline in the workplace. Yet the common law of work accidents also embodied a limited conception of managerial control over the processes of production and created a legal regime that may even have protected the persistence of informal worker discretion over the processes of production. Workmen's compensation reform on the other hand-to which the Note turns in Part II-at once responded to and accelerated the dramatically expanded managerial control of the workplace represented by the scientific management revolution of the first decade of the twentieth century. In one sense, workmen's compensation's commitment to bringing at least an element of public control into the private power structure of the employment relation represented an opportunity to reconstruct a democratic governance of work. As we shall see, however, most supporters of workmen's compensation sought not so much to democratize the work relation as to realize the potential of expert managerial administration of work.
For those who had sought to uphold the dignity of meaningful work, then, workmen's compensation signaled and gave shape to a crisis for the nineteenth-century work ethic: In a world in which managers controlled even the details of production, it was no longer clear that labor could meaningfully be said to do any moral work. This new organization of work posed particularly acute difficulties for the skilled industrial craftsmen who formed the heart of the late nineteenth-century labor movement, and Part III describes the ambiguities of these workers' hesitant but ultimate acceptance of workmen's compensation. In conclusion, the Note turns to a little-known 1910 proposal by Louis D. Brandeis for special juries of workmen to resolve work accident cases. For those, like Brandeis, who believed that self-governance in work was critical to sustaining self-governance in politics, the abandonment of 6. DANIEL critical components of the moral foundation of a self-governing citizenry.'6 There were, of course, sharp differences of opinion over how work contributed to moral virtue and over what kind of work was required to sustain such virtue. For the skilled artisan craftsmen who held on to the republicanism of the late eighteenth century, preservation of republican self-government rested on citizens' ownership of the means of the production; only the economically independent producer would be free of the relationships of dependence that threatened to corrupt virtuous self-government.'7 Among elites, a different, narrower conception of free labor began to emerge in the years before the Civil War. On this view-which bore important traces of classical political economy and of the Enlightenment idea of possessive individualism"-the status of wage earner rather than independent owner-producer was sufficient to sustain a narrowed conception of the relationship between work and virtue.'9 Yet for all the internal divisions within the nineteenth-century ethic of free labor, many of the competing conceptions of free labor shared a rhetorical commitment to the dignity and importance of work. Skilled workers and elites alike argued that a worker's skill and his exercise of judgment and discretion over work processes served an educative function, training citizens for the work of self-government by their participation in the governance of work processes. For English immigrant and mechanic Timothy Claxton in the 1830s, as for Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen leader and editor William Sayre in the 1870s, dignified and productive labor served as the foundation of personal and national virtue.20 Similarly, middle-class reformers such as New York Tribune editor Horace Greeley and Unitarian William Ellery Channing believed that the processes of labor were closely linked to the "mental development and
The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 107: 1467 moral culture" of a self-governing citizenry.' Indeed, for Channing, it was the very "pains" that work could and did inflict that performed the morally constitutive work of labor. "[B]y its perils, which demand continuous vigilance," he argued, economic life developed critical moral and mental faculties.22 For those schooled in the ideology of republicanism, the expansion of wage earning as a permanent status for the working classes threatened to undermine the kind of economic autonomy necessary to sustain independent citizenship.23 But for others, skill in a trade and the capacity to exercise discretion over work could provide a modicum of economic independence for skilled workers even within the wage-labor employment relation.24 Skill in a trade could function as a kind of property, providing its owner with some of the same kinds of economic independence that had characterized the independent craftsmen of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.25 Thus, in addition to training workers for citizenship, skilled wage labor could sustain a modicum of the economic independence that had once been found in independent artisanal crafts. 26 The work ethic, however, could also be put to uses that undermined worker independence. In the hands of employers, affirmations of the value of manual labor often served not so much to uphold the dignity of labor as to legitimate new forms of industrial exploitation.27 The moral value of work could become a moral imperative to labor, with less regard for the moral virtue that work could inculcate than for the maintenance of a bourgeois social order constructed at the expense of the laboring poor.28 Social Darwinist William 21. HORACE ways in which the idea of the dignity of labor could be deployed); RODGERS, supra note 6, at 210-32 (describing the ideological uses to which the work ethic was put).
28. On the ways in which the moral value of work was transformed into a moral imperative to work by elites in the late 19th century, see Amy Dru Stanley, Beggars Can't Be Choosers: Compulsion and Graham Sumner, for example, argued that the correspondence "between work and reward" was the foundation of personal responsibility.29 For Sumner, that correspondence served to stigmatize "the woes of poverty ... [and] the penalties of idleness."30 The role of "the faithful workman" in Sumner's view was to "subject himself to discipline."3' In this incarnation of the work ethic, bodily pain-even "the plucking out [of] an eye or cutting off [of] a limb," to use the words of New York charity organizer Josephine Shaw Lowell-served the critical role of disciplining the immoral poor who refused to work.32
Control over the Processes of Production in the Nineteenth Century
The plausibility of the nineteenth-century work ethic-in all of its forms-was sustained by an organization of work that, at least among the skilled white male industrial workers to whom the work ethic was usually attached, often left considerable room for worker discretion. To be sure, workers' informal control of work processes was often hotly contested by employers. By the middle of the nineteenth century, the material conditions that had sustained the artisanal republicanism of the early republic had been substantially undermined by growing inequality between master and journeyman and by the emergence of wage labor as the dominant economic relationship.33 Moreover, many employers sought to impose their own control over work through hierarchical shop-floor discipline of their workforces. Such employers posted workplace regulations,34 demanded that workers accustomed to preindustrial agricultural rhythms adapt themselves to new and rigid work schedules,35 and established a new class of foremen and room overseers to supervise the processes of production.36 Contract in Postbellum America, 78 J. AM. HIST. 1265 (1992), which describes an increase in vagrancy prosecutions and coercive enforcement of labor discipline among the laboring poor in the 1 870s. 
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1872, at 30 (1967) (estimating that roughly two-thirds of those who worked outside the home were wage earners by 1870); RODGERS, supra note 6, at 36-37 & 250 n.12 (same). Yet recent scholarship has revealed that a number of nineteenth-century firms and industries adopted management practices and strategies that relied on the preservation of a skilled workforce.37 Such firms did not engage in the harsh deskilling and hierarchical rulemaking that characterized industrial work in places such as the New England textile mills. At the Baldwin Locomotive Works in Philadelphia, for example, a producerist ethic linked employers and workers together as partners in the work of skilled production.38 Moreover, even as some employers sought to impose new forms of discipline in the industrial workplace, workers actively resisted their attempts and were often able to retain considerable discretion in the direction of their labor.39 Indeed, in many emerging forms of industrial work, workers were able to establish considerable amounts of discretion and control over their labor. Practices such as inside contracting permitted skilled workers to take charge of particular production projects.40 In iron rolling, for example, workers collectively contracted with their employer on only the total tonnage rate and controlled the division of labor and the allocation of pay themselves.4' For other skilled factories of New England and Pennsylvania, which employed large numbers of unskilled workers, many of them women. See THOMAS Moreover, in work accident cases courts put the nineteenth-century work ethic to dubious use by affirming the importance of worker control over their work and their working conditions in ways that placed the blame for accidents on the workers themselves-even in cases in which the injured employee could not have influenced or controlled the circumstances leading to the accident. By turning the work ethic into a moral imperative, the injured worker, like the unemployed worker, became morally suspect for failing to live up to his responsibility for the conditions of his work.52 In such cases, courts deflected the issue of employers' power over their employees by appealing to the work ethic and the notion that moral character inhered in the sound exercise of discretion in the workplace.53
For examples of workplace regulations and employers' attempts to enforce them, see JONATHAN PRUDE, THE COMING OF INDUSTRIAL ORDER: TOWN AND FACTORY LIFE IN RURAL MASSACHUSETrS
Nonetheless, when courts asserted that employees "knew as much with respect to the safety of the [workiplace" as their employers,54 they appear to have been engaged in something other than willful hypocrisy. 53. In Farwell, Shaw argued that the fellow servant doctrine rested on the "great principle of social duty" that required every man to be responsible to himself and others "in the management of his own affairs." Farwell v. Boston & W.R.R., 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 49, 55-56 (1842). Such uses of the idea of personal responsibility-especially given that Farwell's injury was due to the negligence of a switchman whom Farwell had likely never met and over whom Farwell certainly had no control-functioned to obscure (I) that employees on the railroads were in fact engaged in wage labor for the benefit of the railroad company and its shareholders; and (2) that the legally constructed employment relation did not give employees the kind of power that they would have needed to exercise such responsibility over their working conditions. William Graham Sumner's views, expressed in an 1887 essay, performed precisely the same work. According to Sumner, the common law Qf work accidents properly described employees as "independent members of society, each pursuing happiness in his own way." SUMNER, supra note 29, at 263. The law, on this view, served the salutary function of promoting employee responsibility for working conditions. Yet just a paragraph later Sumner observed that because the worker (like the bondholder) held a "specific" or fixed interest in the firm and thus was "free from risk," he was properly "excluded from control" of the firm. Id. at 264. Sumner, then, affirmed the value of employee responsibility for the risks of work even as he precluded workers from exercising the kind of control that could have influenced working conditions. 54. Kimmer v. Weber, 45 N.E. 860, 861 (N.Y. 1897).
Nineteenthcentury work accident cases articulated a remarkably narrow conception of the possibilities for pervasive and far-reaching managerial control of the workplace. The courts accordingly denied claims when they arose out of "one what rules the board of Directors establish for the safety of life and property, still the agent may or may not observe them as he pleases [without any impact on his chances of recovery]"). On this point in the
The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 107: 1467 of the details of the business that is generally left to the workmen themselves."55 A master, it was held, was not bound to "supervise and direct every detail of [his workers'] labor."56 Consequently, courts declined to extend an employer's duty of "personal supervision" "down in the chain of delegated appointments."57 Instead, they held that a railroad was not responsible for supervising the details of the work process;58 that an employer was not obliged to "oversee and supervise the execution detail of all mechanical work carried on under his employment";59 and that an employer was "justified in leaving to [the employees] the exercise of their own discretion and judgment."60
By contrast, the few judges who rejected the fellow servant rule and upheld employers' vicarious liability for the negligence of one employee that resulted in injury to another did so by appealing to the importance of effective managerial control over the workplace. The Wisconsin Supreme Court rejected the fellow servant doctrine by articulating a broad conception of employer control and arguing that such control over the conduct of employees implied an obligation to pay for injuries to one employee caused by another employee's negligence.6' In the Wisconsin court's view, the fellow servant rule "overlook[ed] the real influence which the liability to an action" would have on employers to exert control over the processes of production in order to reduce accident risks.62 Along slightly different lines, Justice Robert B.
Warden of the Ohio Supreme Court claimed that the law ought to reward employee obedience by ensuring that obedient employees recovered.63 He argued against adoption of the fellow servant rule because an employee who "agree[d] to be faithful" ought to be able to recover from his employer for the negligence of a fellow employee.64 Warden even speculated that the employee "watchfulness" that the common law rules claimed to promote might be turned by employees against their superiors and would thus "be an end of all . subordination" in the workplace.65 55. Id. Just as courts seeking to extend liability were required to invoke a broad conception of employer control of work processes, injured employees were required to appeal to a notion of broad employer responsibility for the workplace in order to frame claims of vicarious liability against employers. In the 1837 case of Barnes v. Boston & Worcester Railroad,66 for example, the Massachusetts Court of Common Pleas sustained the claim of an injured railroad employee similar to the claim brought several years later in Farwell.67 According to Tomlins, the case represented the law's opportunity to recognize the "public interest in the conditions prevailing in industrial workplaces."68 Yet Barnes's claim appears to have advanced the idea that, like the master of a former age, the employer possessed a quasi-jurisdictional responsibility for the workplace.69 As historian Robert Wiebe has observed, the Barnes case adopted a language of deference.70 Counsel for Barnes denied any intention of attacking the "numerous excellent gentlemen" of the railroad company's management.' Instead, he appealed to the notion that the railroad had been obliged to "provide Barnes with a safe means of transportation."72 Yet in making that appeal, Barnes was required to frame his argument in a way that could legitimate the control of his employer. The critical point was that the railroad was responsible for Barnes's injury because its management 66. Barnes is not a reported case. We know of Barnes thanks to Tomlins's research efforts. See TOMLINS, supra note 15, at 301-03, 331-33, 341-47. 67. The court made a preliminary finding in favor of the employee, but while the railroad company's appeal was pending, the parties consented to submit the case to arbitration. The employee was awarded $3000 in damages in the arbitration proceeding. See id. at 331-32, 345. 68. Id. at 346. 69. In the 18th century, employers' obligations for the upkeep of injured servants had been linked to hierarchical status relations that gave employers considerable disciplinary authority over the employees for whose health and upkeep they were responsible. On the colonial practice of enjoining from "putting out" sick or injured apprentices and indentured servants, see STEINFELD, supra note 47, at 25, 49, 59, 154-55. This legal obligation did not extend to wage laborers, who were not understood to be within the household jurisdiction of the master. See id. at 25. Nonetheless, even as late as the Early Republic, the distinction between wage and domestic labor was blurred by a household model of economy in which residence and work were often overlapping categories and in which wages were often paid in the form of room and board. See had controlled the operations.73 Employees, then, were required by the structure of the law of work accidents to shape their claims in a way that affirmed employers' control over their own work.74 The rules of fellow servant, assumption of risk, and contributory negligence may even have encouraged the persistence of informal worker control within the wage labor employment relation by structuring the law to minimize employers' interests in exercising thorough control over production. To be sure, the common law rules could create positive incentives for employee obedience. But employees' first priority must surely have been to avoid accidents altogether rather than obey work rules in order to retain the ability to recover in case of accident. For employers, on the other hand, a legal regime that imposed liability for work accidents could have created incentives to increase the extent of their control over the workplace and over the day-today conduct of employees. The courts themselves appear to have believed that there was a correspondence between liability and control. As we have already seen, the Wisconsin Supreme Court's rejection of the common law rules rested in part on the claim that increased exposure to liability would induce employers to exert increased control over production.75 Moreover, in accident cases involving passengers rather than workers, the U.S. Supreme Court argued that it was necessary to preserve employers' vicarious liability for accidents arising out of employee work rule violations in order to ensure that employers exerted "the most stringent enforcement of discipline"76 over their employees. 
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In this respect, it is noteworthy that
Smith eds. & trans., International Publishers 1971) (1948))). The point here is that the common law of work accidents discouraged this kind of hegemonic formation by rejecting claims that tacitly appealed to and legitimated employer authority. Of course, as Genovese's interpretation of the law of slavery argues, the law's rejection of claims could serve to reproduce private forms of authority by leaving workers (or, in
Genovese's account, slaves) with nowhere to turn except to the paternalism of the employer (or master). As almost all writers on the subject agree, however, employer benevolence in accident cases was spotty at best. See, e.g., LICHT, supra note 44, at 201-11. Only in the last third of the 19th century did some firms begin to develop private accident compensation funds. See Robert Common law rules that limited the scope of liability, on the other hand, structured the law so as to relieve employers of the imperative of such "stringent enforcement" and in the process may have fostered a zone of relative autonomy for workers out on the rails or on the shop floor.
D. The Politics of Nineteenth-Century Work Accident Law
Like the ideology of free labor generally, the common law of work accidents was constructed in contradistinction to the relations of dependence and obligation that characterized slavery and indentured servitude.77 This dynamic had a deeply ambiguous impact on free labor in the North. The dignity that nineteenth-century Americans attributed to free labor became one of the foundations of the producer ideology of workers who sought to defend the dignity of their work and to better their working conditions. Yet the construction of the free labor employment relationship against the backdrop of an unfree "other" was in some ways a selective response to labor coercion that had the effect of legitimating nonslave forms of labor exploitation.78
Noting the ambiguity of the free labor relation is not to say that the common law of work accidents did not in each case favor employers over injured workers. It did, of course. But at the same time, the common law of work accidents reproduced the full ambiguity of the work ethic that-for sometimes very different reasons-so preoccupied a wide range of nineteenthcentury Americans. The ideal of self-direction in work and responsibility for one's working life and conditions could, in the hands of the courts in work accident cases, become ways to promote worker behavior that internalized work discipline. Yet ideas about worker responsibility for working conditions also placed a loose set of bounds on ideas about employers' capacity to exert control over the details of production.
Significantly, the labor movement's advocacy of employers' liability reform developed remarkably late. It was not until the 1870s and 1880s that rules and regulations.88 As with employee claims earlier in the century, these doctrines required injured employees to frame their claims in terms that demanded not an end to managerial discipline, nor even less discipline, but rather better and more consistent discipline.89
II. THE POLITICS OF WORKPLACE CONTROL AND THE AMBIGUITIES OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
The movement to enact workmen's compensation legislation arose out of a law of employers' liability that had become "'choked and crippled with exceptions"'90 and that workers, reformers, and employers alike had come to see as unworkable. Workmen's compensation reform, however, was more than an attempt to bring justice and rationality to the law of workplace accidents. The common law of workplace accidents had reflected and reproduced a nineteenth-century work ethic that (for all its capacity for manipulation in the service of industrial employers) had maintained a complex relationship to informal worker control over the processes of production. The development of broad doctrinal exceptions in the last decades of the nineteenth century, in turn, had begun to indicate the breadth of new conceptions of managerial responsibility for work. The shift to workmen's compensation, then, signaled a decisive shift toward new technologies of control in the workplace and toward new ideas about the moral value of work.
A. Workmen's Compensation: Standardizing Costs or Legitimating Control?
To contemporaries, perhaps the most extraordinary feature of workmen's compensation was the speed with which it completely revolutionized the law of workplace accidents.9' That speed can be attributed largely to the way in which workmen's compensation brought together the two dominant strains of progressive thought: social connectedness and social efficiency.92 Workmen's compensation thus found the support of a coalition that included members from across the entire spectrum of progressivism. Business leaders from both large corporations and small-to mid-size manufacturing companies supported compensation legislation.93 So, too, did government labor officials, labor economists, muckraking journalists, and reform-minded lawyers. In their view, the dictates of justice and efficiency were fully aligned. As the National Civic Federation, a prominent gathering of elite business and labor leaders, announced, workmen's compensation would at once further "'principles of private right and distributive justice."'94
Since
the late 1960s, historians have explained progressive business elites' support of workmen's compensation by arguing that the critical moving force behind the enactment of workers' compensation was big business's need to standardize or even reduce the costs of industrial accidents.95 The evidence from New York, however, suggests that insurance companies expected employers' costs to be considerably higher under workmen's compensation than they had been under the common law regime.96 Moreover, it is not clear that standardization was a "need" of the turn-of-the-century corporate economy. Insurance already allowed businesses to standardize the cost of spread of accident prevention measures by employers as a result). The movement to enact compensation laws promised, in the words of one insurance industry commentator in 1912, "to sweep like a prairie fire [across] this country from the Atlantic to the Pacific. No prophet is needed to foresee that practically every State in the Union will soon have thrown the inhuman and obsolete code of Employers' Liability laws and
practices into the scrap-heap ...." EDWARD BUNNELL PHELPS, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 1 (1912).
For the idea that progressivism was characterized by the interwoven and sometimes competing strands of social connectedness and social efficiency, see Daniel T. Rodgers, In Search of Progressivism, 10 REVS. AM. HIST. 13 (1982). Rodgers suggests that antimonopoly should be understood as a third strand of progressivism, but that strand played little role in the story told here. 93. Indeed, the large corporations and elite labor leaders of the National Civic Federation, and the smaller manufacturing concerns of the National Association of Manufacturers-organizations that generally found themselves bitterly opposed to one another on issues relating to labor-both supported compensation legislation. See Ferd. C. Schwedtman, Relief Tendencies in the United States, AM. INDUSTRIES, Aug. 1911, at 19, 19 (writing as the head of the National Association of Manufacturers' Industrial Accident Indemnity Committee in the Association's trade publication that "[e]very student of the history of relief schemes for work accidents in foreign countries knows that compulsory action through state or federal laws is necessary to make satisfactory progress"); Accident Compensation, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 1911, at 11 (reporting the Civic Federation's advocacy of workmen's compensation).
94. Accident Compensation, supra note 93 (quoting a National Civic Federation committee report). 95. See LUBOVE, supra note 5, at 49; Weinstein, supra note 5. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 98, at 7 (arguing that the "laissez-faire" tenet that the market would adjust wages upward in dangerous industries to reflect the risk of injury simply "does inevitably follow from that belief. Other reform steps such as minimum wage legislation or liberalization of the law of labor actions might have addressed the issue of new industrial conditions by raising wages (or allowing workers to raise them) in order to incorporate the risk of accidents into the wage bargain, or by giving workers the power to demand safety measures.
See AETNA LIFE INS. Co., NEW YORK EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY AND COMPENSATION LAWS 10 (1910) (announcing a 50% rate increase in response to New York's compensation legislation);
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The moving force behind workmen's compensation legislation, then, was neither the "need" to standardize costs, nor the inevitability of accidents under modern industrial conditions. Rather, the critical factor was a revolutionary new aspiration for managerial control in the workplace to generate social efficiencies. For in addition to noting the inevitability of work accidents, progressives had begun to focus on new managerial technologies that might lower the toll of industrial injuries to its irreducible minimum.
B. Scientific Management and Workmen's Compensation
Despite the development of new methods of managerial control in the decades after the Civil War, the American industrial workplace continued to be characterized by antiquated theories of management into the first decade of the twentieth century. In the same years that the workmen's compensation movement was accelerating, however, progressive efficiency enthusiasts were remaking the sociology of the employment relation around Frederick Winslow Taylor's concept of scientific management.
Nineteenth-century approaches to management came under sharp criticism from Taylor.'05 In Taylor's view, conventional managerial practices required that "each workman shall be left with the final responsibility for doing his job practically as he thinks best, with comparatively little help and advice from the management."'06 As a result, instead of a standard practice for a given step in the production process, there were "fifty or a hundred different ways of doing each element of the work," ways that had "been handed down from man to man by word of mouth."107 "[T]here was but a remote chance . . that [any one worker] should hit upon the one best method of doing each piece of work out of the hundreds of possible methods which lay before him."108 not work out"). Shaw, it should be noted, had not purported to describe reality so much as state a normative principle of contract law: the "legal presumption" that the wage bargain reflected the risk of accidents. Farwell, 45 Mass. (4 Met.) at 57. Taylor's pretensions to scientific standards of management were in fact absurd,"4 and the dream of completely removing discretionary power from the ranks of workers was one that could never completely be instituted."5 Yet the theory of scientific management came to enjoy widespread popularity. Even when specific programs were not put into action, scientific management captured the aspirations of management to exercise an extraordinary new disciplinary power in the workplace, and its widespread popularity among progressives signaled an acceptance of the idea that the workplace ought to be reorganized around efficient control of work processes by management."6 not guarantee that they would hit upon the most efficient means of doing the job. See id. at 34-36. 109. Id. at 1 14. 110. Testifying before a congressional committee in 1912, Taylor claimed that "in practically all of the mechanic arts the science which underlies each workman's act is so great and amounts to so much that the workman who is best suited to actually doing the work is incapable, either through lack of education or through insufficient mental capacity, of understanding this science." Id. at 89. 111. The science of the expert was set squarely in opposition to the informal worker discretion in work processes that had characterized much 19th-century production. See id. at 63 (recognizing that the 113. See NELSON, supra note 105, at 56. 114. As Robert Kanigel has shown in his recent biography of Taylor, the means by which Taylor and his disciples "scientifically" determined the best way to accomplish a particular task were themselves shot through with arbitrary value judgments. See KANIGEL, supra note 105, at 511-14 (describing the vulnerability of time-study to "trickery, self-delusion, error, and guess").
For accounts of Taylor and scientific management, see SAMUEL HABER, EFFICIENCY AND UPLIFr
115. See GRAMSCI, supra note 74, at 301-10 (observing that discretion is never completely removed from work processes). Workplace accident law reform and scientific management shared a common commitment to systematizing and rationalizing the governance of work. Both movements spoke the language of efficiency,"7 and both movements sought to realize social gains (social productivity for Taylor and accident prevention for workmen's compensation advocates) by placing control in the hands of management. Indeed, by increasing employers' work accident costs, workmen's compensation accelerated the process by which management took increased control over the details of production. In the name of "safety first," American managers responded to workmen's compensation by developing detailed rules and regulations for particular work processes, dictating that workers wear certain kinds of clothing and protective gear, and generally undermining workers' control over their work lives."8 Moreover, both workmen's compensation and scientific management had abandoned the nineteenth-century linkage between work and the moral virtue necessary to sustain democratic citizenship. In the place of self-directed worker citizens, Taylorism posited a social order run and protected by experts who could distribute social costs in keeping with social benefits. Likewise, supporters of workmen's compensation argued that efficiency required that the system of accident compensation be rationalized and placed in the hands of rational administrative bodies precisely because production was and should be squarely within the control of management. What was needed, wrote one commentator, was a "scientific system of working-men's compensation.""9 "As the apostles of scientific management have shown us," he argued, "we Americans have wasted foolishly in the individual processes of our industry."'20 In the view of progressive supporters of social insurance, it followed from the employer's control over the factors of production-employee and machine alike-that the employer was responsible for injuries that might occur to labor. "The wage-worker," wrote social insurance expert Charles Richmond Henderson, "has special claims upon collective consideration because he no longer has any ownership in the materials and instruments of production, nor any voice in management of the process nor control of the conditions under which his mind and body may suffer."'2' In Henderson's view, the economic condition of the modern wage worker, who was under the control of the "manager of business,"122 mandated provision of relief in instances of industrial suffering and distress. Workmen's compensation thus reaffirmed (and was itself reaffirmed by) the extension of managerial control represented by scientific management. Indeed, workmen's compensation also gave rise to a sophisticated new economic theory of work accident law that served to legitimate new aspirations for pervasive managerial control. On this view, employers and managers rather than workers were the parties with the expertise and the power to bring discipline to the workplace and reduce the accident toll by rationalizing the processes of production. 125 As Progressive social insurance expert E.H. Downey argued, management control combined with managerial internalization of the costs of production would produce the socially optimal level of accident prevention and social goods production.'26 The cost of accidents properly lay with the employer, on this reasoning, because control over work and the capacity to minimize the cost of accidents properly lay with the employer.
Some recent scholarship has questioned the extent of Taylor's impact on modern industrial practices in terms of
C. Workmen's Compensation and the New Ideology of Work
By raising the price of work accidents, the workmen's compensation statutes pushed management to develop new modes of control over work.'27
The increased managerial adoption of responsibility for safety in the workplace in the years after the enactment of workmen's compensation had the important 123. WAINWRIGHT COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 98, at 130. COMPENSATION LAWS 13 (1912) . 125. As William Graebner has observed, "The widespread use of the word discipline to describe a solution to the problem of mine accidents is perhaps the best indication that mine accidents and fatalities were believed to be caused by an absence of such discipline, by the absence of order and control." GRAEBNER, supra note 117, at 162. Indeed, the same years that witnessed reform in work accident law saw the emergence of increased concern among public health professionals for the problem of industrial hygiene, a development that 
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effect of reducing accident rates in American workplaces.'28 But it also entailed compromising the kinds of informal worker practices and discretionary authority that had undergirded the idea of work's intrinsic value.'29
The deep ambiguity of workmen's compensation, then, was that even as it reduced accident rates and sought to relieve injured workers from the harsh conditions they faced under the existing common law rules, it accommodated the law to the removal of workers' participation in the control of their working lives without conceiving of new ways to institutionalize worker selfgovernance. Workmen's compensation did not, of course, cause the erosion of worker discretion over the processes of production. Many reformers sought not so much to legitimate the existing conditions of industry as to describe them and construct some sort of pragmatic solution for the problem of industrial accidents. Crystal Eastman, for example, in her year-long study of the working conditions of Pittsburgh, sought to "work out a law of employers' liability which will approximate justice in the existing industrial world."'30 Because, as Eastman argued, only about one-third of industrial accidents could be traced to worker negligence, '1' requiring employers to bear at minimum a significant share of the costs of industrial accidents could lead to a significant reduction in the annual toll of work injuries.'32 Yet disentangling description from legitimation was a difficult task. If under modern work processes management was thought to be best able to prevent the majority of work accidents, disciplining management to require it to reduce work injuries could, ironically enough, work to ratify such work processes, and even to accelerate their establishment in laggard industries.'33 128. See id. at 104, 284-314 (documenting declining accident rates and increased managerial concern for safety in the workplace in the post-workmen's compensation years); see also COMMONS & ANDREWS, supra note 91, at 414 (arguing that increased safety provisions by management were traceable to the enactment of workmen's compensation statutes).
129. See ALDRICH, supra note 96, at 7 (arguing that the "safety first" movement required workers to trade away informal discretionary control in the workplace for increased safety); see also Kurt Wetzel, 
Workers and Machines: The Problem of Commodification
Just underneath the nineteenth-century ideal of the worker as self-directed and independent had been a haunting fear that modern industry might be reducing workers to the condition of mere machines.'34 Progressives, however, did not resist the analogy of worker to machine so much as they embraced it as proof of the employer's responsibility to pay for industrial injuries to their workers. "[J]ust as employers now fix their selling price with reference to the cost of replacing and repairing machinery," argued the New York State commission appointed to investigate employers' liability, "so we would have them make an element of the price of the product the cost of relieving the injured workers of hazardous industry."'35 When "accidents befall machines," complained the editors of the Outlook, "the industry pays."'36 Why, then, when "those accidents befall men" did they "become a personal matter"?'37 What was needed, the editors noted, was a legal regime in which "the cost of the injury to men is put on the same basis as the cost of injury to machinery."'38 In progressives' analogies, the industrial workforce regressed into the machinery around them, as if there were no middle ground between autonomous agent and automaton. 139 note 91, at 414. 134. By the 1 890s, the image of man as machine was able to spark real controversy, as when a New York audience reacted in a storm of protest to one speaker's suggestion that strikes were the justified reaction of workers to the "mechanicalization" of the workingman. See RODGERS, supra note 6, at 65-93; see also TRACHTENBERG, supra note 16, at 38-69. For workers' complicated and oft-contradictory responses to the introduction of mechanicalized production processes into the workplace in the early-and mid-19th century, see ZONDERMAN, supra note 34, at 21-62. idea that work had intrinsic value could be a source of dignity for workers, it could also be a tool for employers seeking to enforce labor discipline in exploitative work situations. But the idea that work could be intrinsically rewarding was wholly absent from the workmen's compensation debates. Workmen's compensation supporters conceived of work as accruing not to the benefit of the worker but to employers or to the public.'59 The worker benefited from the process of production not as a worker but only insofar as he might count himself as a member of the consuming public. Work, in short, was no longer thought to be important for its own sake. Workmen's compensation reflected changes in the ideology of work as much as, or even more than, it created them. Late nineteenth-and earlytwentieth-century capitalism had removed much of work's morally constitutive characteristics wholly independently of work accident law. Yet the impact of workmen's compensation should not be underestimated. In the enactment of workmen's compensation, middle-and upper-class reformers signaled their abandonment of the conceptual link between work and moral virtue and thus legitimated and accelerated the extension of managerial control in the workplace; if management paid for workplace accidents, the argument for managerial control was that much stronger.
III. LABOR AND WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION REFORM
Workmen's compensation posed a difficult problem for workers and unions. It offered workers and their families a material resource to cope with work injuries and deaths. But it was advanced in a language of efficiency that threatened to routinize and legitimize increased managerial control of the workplace. Workers ultimately supported workmen's compensation programs; from a pragmatic perspective, the promise of state insurance against industrial accidents was simply too great for workers to refuse. In their halting support for workmen's compensation reform, however, labor was obliged tacitly to compromise the ideals of dignity and discretion in work processes that had been at the heart of the nineteenth-century labor movement.
A. Employer Fault and the Dilemma of No-Fault Insurance
Workers were hardly unaware of the implications of compensation plans for control over the processes of production. By the 1900s, workers had gained considerable experience with the private compensation plans that large employers began to put in place beginning in the late 1860s and 1870s, plans 159. " [I]f the instrumentality through which the injury is caused be conducted primarily for the benefit of the individual" who employs the injured party, announced one lawyer, "it is not arbitrary, but reasonable and just, if he be made to indemnify the injured person." LORD, supra note 124, at 13. that were designed in large part to extend management's control over the workplace by undermining workers' trade union affiliations and increasing the costs of quitting.'60 When workers began in the last third of the nineteenth century to militate for a liberalized law of workplace accidents, they pushed for the abolition of the employers' defenses of fellow servant and assumption of risk rather than no-fault compensation.
State federations of workingmen supported this type of employers' liability legislation through the final two decades of the nineteenth century.'62
In championing employers' liability legislation, workers and their unions sought to establish a principled compromise with the ideal of worker selfcontrol by emphasizing the idea of blame. In one sense, union support for employers' liability reform pushed unions to abandon the notion that work in and of itself was a distinctively important activity in the constitution of an independent and self-disciplined citizenry: Workers, the unions argued, ought to be on the same footing before the law as passengers.'63 But in their advocacy of liberalized liability rules, workers emphasized the social condemnation and assignment of fault that accompanied the common law negligence principle.'64 In the common law trial, the adjudication of work accident claims allowed juries of an injured worker's peers to announce the responsibility and fault of the employer.'65 No such middle ground was available for no-fault workmen's compensation. No-fault compensation plans smacked of the relief funds run privately by employers, schemes that had been designed to undermine worker control and worker organizations.'66 Moreover, compensation replaced the [Vol. 107: 1467 assignment of fault with a system that threatened to rationalize industrial accidents and substitute professionalized administration without regard to fault for jury trial on the question of culpability. Finally, compensation schemes appeared to impose a state-sponsored paternalism for the paternalism of the employer.'67 Thus, "sore and sad" as American Federation of Labor leader Samuel Gompers was as a result of the "killing, the maiming of so many of [his] fellow workers," he sought to effect "their own emancipation through their own efforts."'68
As a result of worker suspicion of state-sponsored no-fault insurance schemes, compensation remained a middle-to upper-class reform throughout the first decade of the twentieth century.'69 Labor's opposition to progressive compensation schemes remained strong in some sectors as late as 1910. When the United States Brewers' Association organized a comprehensive, industrywide relief fund with the aid of progressive reformers, rank-and-file workers bitterly opposed the plan in favor of an insurance system run by the workers themselves. 170 The difficulty with workers' persistent opposition to workmen's compensation was that their own employers' liability reform proposals met with little success. Unions repeatedly found their proposals buried in legislative committees and simply never acted on.'7' When legislatures did enact reform legislation, more often than not it was weakened by exceptions to the very exceptions it enacted and then further weakened by narrow judicial construction.'72 Unable to enact their own liability reform program and confronted with the fact that only twenty-five percent of all industrial accidents were resulting in payments from the employer to the employee, many workers turned to workmen's compensation.'73
B. The Ambiguities of Worker Acceptance
Labor began to shift toward support for workmen's compensation around 1909.174 Acceptance of and support for compensation was halting even then.'75 Some workers, for example, supported a regime of criminal sanctions against employers for injuries to their employees.'76 Nonetheless, the trend toward support for workmen's compensation was clear, and nowhere more so than in the hearings held by the of the worker is an analogous thing to the breaking down of a machine, and should . . . be included in the regular charges of the business."' Gompers was driven to adopt the idea that workers, like machines, were the responsibility of employers: "Industry must bear the financial burden of accidents to the human being, exactly as it does now in case of accidents to machinery or to other property. "183 "[T]he fact is," Gompers told the Commission, "that labor is becoming so divided and sub-divided and specialized, that the workman has simply to become a part of the machine and the opportunity for him to demonstrate his individuality and capacity and intelligence is passing by very very fast."'84 Like progressive arguments for compensation, labor's language of reform conceded that work itself had little intrinsic value. Work functioned solely to produce profits for the employer. James J. Waters of the Marine Engineers Beneficial Association of Brooklyn testified that "accidents in a large proportion of industrial employments are incidental to the business and just as much a part of the cost and the result for which the business is organized and conducted, as labor or material used in the business."'85 For Waters, the worker had become a part of the employer's business, an incident of production much like the material and equipment of the employer. Moreover, that business operated solely for the benefit of the employer, not the worker. Indeed, Waters's argument tracked the views that had been articulated to the Commission by John White, vice president of the New York Edison Company: The "expense" of workplace accidents, White wrote to the Commission, "should in the first instance be borne solely by the employer as one of the items in his manufacturing costs."'86
Opposition to the commodification of human labor lay at the center of the labor movement in the first decades of the twentieth century.'87 Thus, when labor succeeded in 1914 in having the Clayton Act passed, with its abstract declaration that "the labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce,"'88 Gompers announced that the Act was nothing less than the "Magna Carta" of American labor.'89 Yet even as labor was succeeding in the enactment of the Clayton Act, workmen's compensation debates put labor in the paradoxical position of affirming its status as a factor of production. Workmen's compensation legislation, to be sure, promised to create a new degree of material security for American workers. But by tacitly conceding control over and responsibility for the workplace to the employer, the language of workmen's compensation reform compromised labor's resistance to conceiving of work and workers as mere commodities.
IV. CONCLUSION: BRANDEIS'S JURY OF WORKMEN
This Note has sought to show that the transformation of work accident law reflected and gave shape to the changing ways in which Americans thought about and organized work. This is not to say that the extension of liability necessarily and inevitably required a sacrifice in workers' relative autonomy in the process of production. In the abstract, workmen's compensation legislation could have offered working Americans a renewed participation in the conditions of production. Indeed, some viewed workmen's compensation as reconfiguring on a larger scale the self-help organizations that late nineteenth-century workers had created to insure against accidents.'90 Yet the ambiguity of workmen's compensation was that, set as it was in the context of an early-twentieth-century world of scientific management, it both reflected and reproduced the degradation of work in theory and in practice.
This was not the only road that workmen's compensation reform could have taken. For Louis D. Brandeis, the agitation to reform work accident law reflected a more general need to develop innovative ways to reconstruct worker participation in the control of their working lives.'9' Brandeis sought to resolve the dilemma of work accident law by developing a new institutional framework in which workers would participate in the governance of the workplace.'92 According to Brandeis, workers and employers ought to participate in accident prevention and compensation on an equal basis.'93 Accordingly, he proposed "to secure the fullest cooperation of employer and employee" in a system of accident compensation and prevention that would merge the efficiency of compensation with worker participation in the governance of the workplace.'94 At the core of Brandeis's joint employer-190. See, e.g., HENDERSON, supra note 121, at 10 (describing state insurance as "an act of social cooperation on the part of the entire community").
191. Worker organizations, despite their adoption of a language that potentially undermined some of their broader aims, also sought to find new institutional solutions to worker participation in the governance of work. Union representatives argued that through collective action workers would be able to maintain a modicum of control over the workplace. See, e.g., WAINWRIGHT 
